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ABSTRACT:  This paper  investigates  whether  fiscal  and  monetary  policy actions
are co-integrated  with inequality  'in  the size distribution of
income. The  effects of nonetary  poljcy on the size distributjon
of  income  have  generally  been  ignored  in the literature.  l,le  find
that aggregate  monetary  and  f isca.l  policy neasures  are co-
integrated  with varjous  measures  of income  inequality.  Indeed,
the evidence  from  the error-  correct  i  on specification implied by
the co-integrating regression  suggests  that  impacts  of monetary
policy actions  on  the size distribution  of income  are
stat  i  st  ical  1y  significant.
The  authors  wish to thank  Nathan  Balke,  Tom  Fomby,  Evan  Koenig  and  Cara  Lown
for  helpful comnents  on earljer  drafts of this  paper.  Any  remaining  errors
are so1e1y  our own. The  views  expressed  herein  do not necessarily  reflect
those  of the Federal  Reserve  Eank  of Da.llas  or the Federal  Reserve  System.I.  I  ntroduct  i  on
Ever  s.ince  Pareto's  (1897)  jnitial  study  on  the subject,  economists
have  been  interested  in the role that policy actjons  play in redjstributjng
'income.  Although  the effects  of a tax and  transfer  scheme  on inequality  in
the personal  size distr.ibution  of income  appear  strajghtforward  enough,  the
fjnal  effects are  most  likely distorted  by policy-induced  changes  in labor
supp.ly  incentives,  in consumption  spending  patterns,  and  in factor prices,
and  so forth.  As  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980)  point out,
"The  tax or expenditure  is Iikely to 
.lead 
to changes  in endowments  and
may  we.l  I  affect the general  equil  ibriurn  of the economy.  Thus  a tax on
capital income  may  have  second-round  effects  on  the accumulation  of
both  physjcai  and  human  capital  ."1/
If  both  quantities  and  prices  are affected,  these  second-round  effects need
not be  tr.ivial  .  Consequently,  the direction  of change  jn the shape  of the
size distributjon of income  is anbiguous,  thus  inrplying  that the overal  I
effect on  the level of income  inequality  is indeterrninate.
Tullock  (1983)  underscored  the empirical  importance  of the relationship
bet!./een  policy action  and  inequality  in the size distrjbution of total
income,  stating that "redjstribution  is probably  the most  jmportant  single
function of most  modern  government  s  .  ,'2/  it  would  be useful to better
understand  how  government  pol  icies are related to the 
'level 
of  income
inequality  in a systematic  way,  so  that policy actions  can  be  designed  which
exploit this relationship. Indeed,  jt  is crucial  that some  equilibrir_rm
relationship  exist in order  to valjdate  government  activism  in this regard.
it  is presumed  that changes  in fiscal poljcy have  important  effects on
economic  agentr  s decisions,  which,  in turn, is transmitted  as a change  in
the shape  of the jncome  distribution.  The  role that monetary  pol  icy plays
in the redistribution  process  is not understood  as  well.  It  is furtherpresuned  that the relationship  between  changes  in pol  icy actions  and  changes
in the income  djstribution satisfy an  equiiibrium  condition.  If changes  in
fiscal policy, or monetary  policy, are .important  for redistrjbutional
purposes,  then  the nature  of the equ.i  librium  relat.ionship  between  these
policies and  the income  distribution should  be  detectable  through  empirical
analysis, Davidson,  Hendry,  Srba  and  yeo  (1978)  developed  a methodology  to
test for a certain  class  of equjlibria wh.ich  are  commonly  used  in the
macroeconomics  literature--the  error-correct  i  on representation. In an
error-correction  nodel,  ,,a  proportion  of the disequi  librium  from  one  period
is corrected  in the next  period.,,3/  Granger  has  shown  that an  error
correction  representation  ex.ists  if  a vector  of tjme  series  data  are "co_
i  ntegrated.  "
Co-integration  'is  a statistical property  which  neans  that economic
variables  "hang  together."  In other  words,  both  variables  individually
have  long-run  components,  but a linear combination  of these  varidbles  act
together  to cancel  out these  long-run  components.  Therefore,  testing for
whether  the time  series  are  co-integrated  amounts  to finding  evidence
consistent  with the presence  of an  error-correct  i  on  model  to reDresent  tne
long-run  equi  I  ibrium  reldtionship.
The  specifjc  purpose  of this paper  is to apply  the Engle-Granger  co-
integratjon  methodology  to test whether  both  fiscal and  monetary  policy
variables  are  co-integrated  with income  inequality  (as  measured  by a summary
statistic)  and  hence,  whether  there  is an  error-correct  i  on  nechanism  that
characterjzes  the relat.ionship  bet$/een  policy actions  and  changes  jn the
size djstribution of total  income.  l,Je  dre  not aware  of any  other  studies
which  attempt  such  an  ana'lysis. If  such  a relat.ionship  does  exist, thenrelevant  inforrnation  is provided  to the policymaker  attempting  to formuiate
redistributive strategies,  as  we  discuss  below. It  also  means  that a
serious  evaluation  may  be  necessary  on  previous  empirica'l  work  on  thjs
topic.  In our study,  changes  in the size  distribution of income  are
captured  as changes  in the degree  of inequality  as  measured  by various
measures  of income  inequaiity. Here,  public  policy includes  a broad  measure
of monelary  pol  icy as  well as  various  measures  of fiscal policy.  Monetary
policy's role in this process  has  not been  examjned  very  much  (we  discuss
the exceptions  below)  and  one  of the principle  aims  of this study  is to
analyze  money's  impact  on income  inequality  nore  rigorously, Thus,  the
marginal  contribution  of both  fiscal and  monetary  policy act.ions,  as  they
pertain  to changes  in the size  distribution  of income,  are  considered.
This  paper  is organized  as  follows.  In section  two,  we  discuss  the
relationship  between  policy actjons  and  inequal  ity.  The  error-correct  i  on
model  is reviewed  jn section  three  along  with the presentdtion  of the
empirical  results.  Section  four concludes  the study.
ll.  The  Relationship  between  Macropolicy  and  Inequality
The  theoretical  basis  for the governnent's  redjstribution  role is
wel  l-established. Empirical  analysis  of the effects  of nacroeconomic  policy
effects on the distribution of income,  however,  is limited.  Musgrave,  Case
and  Leonard  (1974)  examined  the effects  of taxes  and  public  spending  on
income  classes. They  found  broad  evidence  that taxes  and  expendjtures  do
affect the distribution of income  between  income  classes. Pechman  and  Okner
(1974)  used  data  at the individual  level, and,  similarly, found  evidence
$ihich  supports  the hypothesis  that tax policy affects  the incomed  i  stri but  i  on.
Metcalf  (1969,  1972),  Beach  (1977)  and  Btinder  and  Esaki  (1978)  each
investigated  how  changes  in the business  cycle  affect the size distribution
of income.  Recently,  Blank  (1985)  and  Btank  and  Btinder  (i986)  have
examined  the impact  of inflation and  unemployment  on inequality,  The
consensus  in this work  is that changes  in the rate of inflation do  not have
an important  redistributjonal  effect on  the economy,  whiie, jn contrast,
changes  in the unemployment  rate do  play  an jmportant  role.in
red  i  stri  buti  ng  income.4/
The  macroeconornic  effects  of pol  icy variables  on  the sjze distrjbution
may  not be linited to fiscal policy,  l,llhat  .is  the long-run  impact  of
monetary  pol  icy on  the size distribut.ion  of income?  The  ,,djstrjbution
effects" of actions  undertaken  by the  monetary  authorjty  are  a generatiy
accepted  short-run phenonenon.  Co-integration,  however,  characterjzes  a
long-run  relationship  bet\4een  economic  varjables. Therefore,  we  are
interested  in long-run  effects  that monetary  policy  may  introduce  as  they
pertain  to the size distrjbution of income.
A once-and-for-alI  increase  in the rate of growth  of monetary
aggregates  is positively  related  to the rate of jnfldt.ion. The  inflation
tax is a potential  source  of distortion in the econorny.  To  the extent  that
the burden  of the inf.lation  tax js not borne  uniformly  by  each  household,  it
wi  I  I dffect the size distribution  of income.  The  Federal  Reserve  also
affects the profitability  of depository  institutions through  reserve
requirements.  l^lith  higher  reserve  requirements,  the Federal  Reserve  forces
depository  institutions to adjust  their portfo'l  ios so that the proport.ion
non-interest-bearing  assets  rises relative to total assets. Thus,  the taxintposed  by reserve  requirements  affects  deposjtory  .instjtutions,  profits.
Russell,  Slottje and  Haslag  (1987)  investigated  whether  or not  monerary
pol  icy affects the size distribut'ion  of income  using  a reduced-form
specification. They  found  preliminary  ev.idence  that such  a relat.ionship
exists between  rnonetary  policy  actions  and  inequality. Balke  and  Slottje
(1988)  also found  evidence  that monetary  policy actjons  affect the shape  of
the size distributjon of income,  In Balke  and  Slottje, the effects of
monetary  po.l  icy on incone  inequality are exafiined  using  a macroeconometr  i  c
model  which  includes  both  the unemployment  rate and  the rate of inflation as
explanatory  variables. None  of this previous  work,  however,  has  considered
the possibility that the link between  policy and  inequaljty  is a co-
i  ntegrated  one.
The  presence  of co-integration  is consistent  with two  (or rnore)  ser.ies
exhibiting  a long-run  relationship. tihile  money  may  have  short-run
distributional effects, putting  a monetary  aggregate  into a co-jntegrating
regression  tests whether  there  js any  permanence  to the effects observed  in
the shont-run  relationship  between  nonetary  po.l  .icy  and  the size  d.istribution
of  income.  In other  words,  it  test whether  monetary  policy has  long-run
"real" effects on  the level of inequal  ity  in the size djstribution of
i  ncome.
I  I  I.  The  Empi  rica  l Evidence
Irr this  paper,  the emphasis  wilI  be on the effects of macroeconomic
pol  icy on the size distrjbution of total  income. l,Je  are interested jn
whether aggregate  measures  of fiscal  and  monetary  pol  icy  affect  the size
distribution  of  income,  and  if  the relationship is an equilibrjum  one.Specifical  ly, we  ask  whether  the proposed  equilibrium  relationship  can  be
represented  by an error-correct  i  on mechanism,
3.1 llgg$fg!  of  Incorne  Inequality
A summary  statistic of the leve.l  of inequality  inherent  jn the
empirical  size distributjon of income  is desirable. Since  every  well-known
inequality  measure  describes  a djfferent aspect  of the empirical
distribut.ion,  several  different measures  are  emp'loyed  in this anaiysis.
One  approach  to nedsuring  income  inequality,  without  imposing  a
functjonal  form  of statistical distribution  on  the income  graduation,  is to
use  Lo)  enz-bdsed  inequality  measures.  The  Lorenz  curve  is defjned  as  the
relationship  between  the cumulative  proport.ion  of income  unjts and  the
cumulative  proportion  of .income  received  when  units are arranged  jn
ascending  order  of their income,  cf. Kakwani  (1980). Lorenz  proposed  this
curve  in 1905  in order  to compare  and  analyze  inequal.ities  of wealth  in a
country  during  d  i  fferent periods.
The  Lorenz  curve  can  be  generated  by defining  the income  earner  irnits
as (say)  quintile share  where  q1, i=1, ...,  5 represents  the i th income
earner  share  and  letting
o < q  < q  .,.  < q  < l. '|  2  5
From  this simpie  ordering  many  well-known  inequality  measures  can  be
formulated. For instance,  the Gini (1913)  measure  js defjned  as,
(l)  G =  1-  I/n  -  2/nI  x(n-k)q  l.
K
The  Ginj measure  js the average  difference of al1 pairwise  comparisons  of
income. It  is most  frequently critjcized  for putting more  weight  on atransfer between  niddle income  earners  than  at the tails  (see  cowe11,  1977).
This  measure  is defined  over  the unjt interval tak.ing  a value  of l when
'income  is "perfectly  concentrated'r  in one  household.  Conversely,  if  the
Gini index  equals  zero, income  is uniformly  distributed  across  households  in
the population. The  relative mean  devjat.ion  measure  is defined  as:
(.?) R  =  n/(2n-2)lLloo  -1lnll.
As  Kakwani  notes,
"if  population  is divided  into two  groups,  (a) those  who  receive
less  than  or equal  to nean  income  and  (b) those  who  receive  more
than  mean  income,  the relative mean  deviation  represents  the
percentage  of total income  that should  be  transferred  from  the
second  group  to the first  so that both  groups  have  exactly the
same  mean  i  ncome.,'5/
It  ajso is a zero-one  measure.  Theil (1967)  normalized  entropy  measure  is
defi  ned  as:
(3)  T  =  I + 1/1n(n)  [xq*  ]nqnl.
Thei.l  formulated  his measure  based  on  whether  a gjven  physical  system  was
more  or less  orderly.  He  reinterpreted  this  'order,  as income  levels.  The
measure  is defined  over  all  non-negative  values.
Kakwani  neasure  takes  the form:
(4)  K  =  1-2/2-?wirh  I  =[tr
and  1p
Kakwani  '  s measure
sum  of i  nequal  ity
to +- 6n6  is more
2  ..? + I  /n'. 'k
looks at inequality between  the classes  and  the weighted
within each  class.  This medsure  takes  on values  from --
sensitjve to redistnibution occurring  between  the middlequjntiles,
Fi  nal  ly, Atkinson,s  (1970)  inequatity
social  welfare  basis  for the index  itself.
is based  upon  an  underlying  social  welfare
def  ine  the i  ndex  as:
i  ndex j  s exp'l  i  ci t  about the
The  index  which  Atkinson  derived
function.  Fol  lowing  Cowel  l,  vre
(5)  S|i =  I - tl,h x (n  o.rl-e ,1/1-e  i = 1,2,..., 5
1
where  e denotes  the "inequality  aversion  parameter.''  Cowel1  interprets  this
parametelin  the following  way. Consjder  a rjch man  R  with five times  the
incorne  that  is received  by a poor  nan, denoted  p.  The  degree  to wh.ich  we
are inequa'l  ity averse  can  be  expressed  as the amount  of income  we  willing to
let R  give  up  to give  a dollar to P.  For  example,  if  e  =  0, we  wili  only
take  $1  from  R  to g.ive  a dollar to P.  It  e = 7/2, we  wi.l  I take  $2.24  from  R
to give a dollar to P.  The  higher  the value  of e, the more  dverse  to
inequality  we  are and  the higher  is the premium  we  are  willing to pay  to
effect a transfer  of a given  quantity  to those  jn the lower  income  groups.
In this study  we  calculated  five Atkinson  inequality  measures  by taking
values  of e of 0.5,0.75,0.95,  1.5  and  2, which  correspond  to Al  , AZ,  A3,
A4  and  A5, re  s  pect  i  ve  ly.
The  quintile data  used  to calculate  these  inequality  measures  are
obtained  from  the Current  Population  Survey.'  The  measure  of monetary  pol.icy
'is  the growth  rate of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St. Louis  adjusted
monetary  base  (ASTLBAS).  The  St. Loujs  base  adjusts  the source  base  for
changes  in reserve  requirement  ratios, and  hence,  reflects all  actions
undertaken  by the monetary  authority.6  /  Four  different measure  of fiscal
policy are  used:  Federal  government  purchases  of goods  and  services  (GpGS),personal  tax payments  net of transfer payments  to  individuals (PITT)  ,
transfer pdyments  to indivjduals  (TRANS),  and  the high-employment  government
budget  surpl  u  s (HEGBS).
Annual  averages  are calculated  for STLBAS,  GPGS,  pITT, TRANS  and  HEGBS,
The  sample  period  is 1947-86.  The  small  sample  size for the analysis  that
follows is problematic.  The  power  of the test statistics in d small  sample
have  yet to be  resolved. Consequently,  we  must  be  cautious  jn jnterpreting
our results.  Unfortunately,  historical data  on inequa.l  ity has  only recently
been  col  I  ected.
Government  efforts to redistribute  income  are  often assoc.iated  with
spec.ific  fiscal programs.T/  The  impact  of specif.ic  programs  means  that the
conpositjon  of government  spending  and  taxes  are assumed  to affect the size
distribution of jncone. At the aggregate  level, separating  out
conpositional  changes  is essentjally  impossible.  Identifying  the direct
effects of specifjc  programs  on  the size distr.ibution  of income  are,
therefore,  overlooked  at the aggregate  level  .
The  systematic  effects of aggregate  federal spending  on the sjze
distribution  of income  will  arise  primar^ily  due  to two  factors.  First, the
goods  and  services in the government  basket  are a proper  subset  of the
goods  dnd  services  in the economy.  An  addjt.ional  $1  dollar of government
spending  increases  the demand  for these  subset  of goods  and  results in
reldtive pr'ice  changes.  The  effects  of higher  government  spending  on the
size distribution of income,  for instance,  reflect households'  responses  to
the relative price changes.  Provided  the incomes  are  not altered
equiproportionately,  the level  of inequality  in the sjze  distr.ibut  jon  will
be  affected.
10A second  way  in which  the increase  in government  spending  might  affect
the size distribution of incone  is based  on  the notion  that government
purchases  substitute  for private  purchases.  Aschauer  (1985)  found  that $l
of federal  government  consumption  substitutes  on  average  for roughly  33
cents  of private consumption.  l,,lh  at the government  buys  lvith a once-and-for-
all  jncrease  in spending  is important. 0n  net, government  purchases
supplant  the denand  for goods  by  the private  sector,  which,  in turn, Iowers
the demand  for  goods  by the private sector and  results in changes  in
relative prices.  The  "shock"  to the demands  for a subset  of goods  will
affect relatjve prices,  which,  in turn, induces  changes  in income  flows
recei  ved  by hou  se  ho  ld  s.
The  impact  of monetary  policy  on  the size distribution  of income  is
postulated  to occur  through  three  channels.  First, the long-run
relationship between  the rate of noney  growth  and  the rate of inflation
means  that Federal  Reserve  policies  may  give rise to a distortionary  tax
vrhicn,  .in  turn affects income  inequality. Like  any  other  distortionary  tax,
the incidence  of a higher  rate of inflation is iikely to be  borne  non-
u  r,i  form  I  y across  households.
Second,  the Federal  Reserve  also  sets  reserve  requirements  which  affect
depository  jnstitutions.  Consequently,  an  increase  in reserve  requirements
distorts the after-tax profits of depository  'institutions. l*loreover,  the
Monetary  Control  Act of 1980  extended  the scope  of the reserve  requirement
tax to all  depository  'institutions  that offer transdct.ion  accounts.  Thus,
the short-run  "d'istributionai  effects" associated  with actions  undertaken  bv
the monetary  authority  may  persist.S/
Third, the interactjon  bet!,een  monetary  and  fjscal policy actions  mdy
11bear  on  the size distribution  of income.  Consider  the case  where  the public
knows  that the present  value  of all  pubiicly-held  government  debt  is exactly
equal  to the present  value  of (completely  internalized)  future tax
obl  igations.  Furthermore,  let the Federal  Reserve  give its profits to the
Treasury  so that principal and  interest paid to the monetary  authority are
transferred  back  to the fiscal authority.  In effect, the Federal  Reserve,s
purchdses  of government  debt  displaces  part of the public,s  current  and
future tax obligations. Hence,  for a given  path  of government  deficits and
surpluses,  a once-  and-for-  al  .l increase  in the rate of money  growth  dchieved
through  open  market  purchases  means  that the present  value  of the public,s
current  and  future tax liabilities  are  decreased,  In this v./ay,  the Federal
Reserve's  interaction  with the  Treasury  affects agent,s  intertemporal  budget
constraints,  which,  in turn, may  gjve  rjse to changes  in the size
d  istri buti  on  of incorne.
In this paper,  !/e  examine  whether  the data  jndicate  that the
distribution of monetary  policy actions  and/or  aggregate  fiscal policy
actions  exhibit a long-run  equilibrium  relationship  with the level of
inequality  in the size  d'istribution  of income.  Generally,  the resujts
exhibjt commonality  across  the alternative  income  inequal  jty measures.
3.2 Results  from  the Univariate  Analysis
Before  we  test for co-integration,  it  is necessary  to deternine  the
order  of integrat.ion  of the time-series  being  considered.  If  the order  of
'integration  is equal  to zero,  then  the ser.ies  is stationary.  If,  on  the
other  hand,  the series  is integrated  of order  d (denoted  I(d)), where  d is
sone  positive number,  then  the series  is non-stationarv.  Univariate
12analysis  is conducted  to determine  the order  of integration. Specifjcal  ly,
unit-root tests are conducted.
Severa.l  methods  to test for the presence  of unit roots are
available.!/  In this paper,  we  adopt  the augmented  Dickey_Fuller
speci  fi cali  on.  That  is,
a
BX*  r  + t  Ax* r.
L_J
i=1
(6)  Axt  = B  + -0
The  presence  or absence  of a unit root depends  on the value  of the
coefficient B,  The  null hypothesis  is thdt the variable,  xt, has  a unjt_
root.  In other  words,  rejectjng  the nuli hypothesis  means  that the series
is stationary.  If the test statistic jndicates  that the coeff  jc.ient  is
significantly (in a statjstical sense)  less  than  zero,  the null hypothesis
is rejected  and  the series  is I(0).  Conversely,  if  the coeff  icient is not
significantly less  thdn  zero,  the series,  xt, does  have  a unit root.  Hence,
the variable  js non-stationary.
The  test statistic  is of the form  of the usual  student's  t for B, but
the distribut.ion  of the test statistic is non-normal  even  asymptotical  ly.
The  appropriate  cumulative  djstnibution  is provided  in Fuller (1976). Fron
this cumulative  distribution, the probability  that the t-statistic  is less
than  -3.00 (i.e.,  the probability  of a Type-i  error) is five percent.
lle  fjrst  examine  each  variable  indjvidually  for the presence  of a unit
root,  Table  1 reports  the results  using  the augmented  D.ickey_Fuller
specification  to test this hypothesis.  The  four fiscal policy medsures  and
the measures  of incone  inequal  ity are in levels,  wh'i  le the rate of growth  of
the adjusted  monetary  base  is being  tested  for a unit root.  In each  case
the vdlue  of the t-statist.ic is c.learly  greater  than  -3.00.  The  Dickey_
13Fu.l  ler tests, therefore,  are  consjstent  with the Dresence  of a unit-root in
each  series.  Thus,  the evidence  suggests  thar the series  are  all  I(d), d >
0.10/
Table  2 repeats  the Dickey-Fuller  tests to determine  if  a second  unru
root is indicated. The  income  inequality  measures  and  the rate of growth  of
the adjusted  monetary  base  are  first-differenced,  but the appropriate
transformation  applied  to GPGS,  PITT,  TRANS  and  HEGBS  .is  to calcutate  the
rate of growth.  With  HEGBS,  the t-statistic  is greater  than  -3.00.  The
autocorrelation  function,  however,  damps  quickly  which  suggests  that the
rats of growth  of the high-employment  government  budget  surplus js
stationary.  Therefore,  rve  will  proceed  with the analysis  treating each
'individua'l  series  as  being  I(1).11/
3.3 Results  from  the Co-inteqration  Tests
tlhile each  of the series  appears  to be  I(1), it  is possible  that Ijnear
combinations  of these  variables  are I(0).  If  so, the existence  of such  a
combination  would  jndicdte  that the vector  of series  are co-jntegrated.
Here,  co-integration  equations  will  be  utjlized to address  questions
concerning  the relationship  betvreen  various  policy  neasures  and  the level of
inequal  ity in the size  distribution  of income,  Specifically,  these
questions  falI  into three  categories. First, are  various  measures  of fiscal
poljcy co-integrated  with the measures  of income  inequaiity? Secondly,  is
the measure  of monetary  poljcy  co-integrated  w.ith  inequaj  ity  in the size
distribution of income?  Las y, are  a vector  of fiscal and  monetary  policy
variables  co-integrated  with the these  inequality  measures?
The  first  t$/o  questions  establish  separate  roles for fiscal and
l4monetary  policy with regard  to the lbvel of inequai  jty  in the sjze
distribution of income.  8y control.l  ing for changes  in the ,,other,'  policy
variable  in the co-integrating  regression,  the third question  examines
whether  the jnteraction  between  fiscal and  monetary  policies js jmportant  jn
explaining  movenents  in the shape  of the size distribution of income.
Table  3 presents  resu.lts  from  the co-integrating  regressions  where  each
fiscal  policy measure  and  the monetary  pol  icy measure  appear  separately.
For  this bivariate  analysis,  both  the Durbjn-t/atson  (D.!/.)  and  augmented
Dickey-Fuller  (A.D,F.)  statistics are  used  for testing co-integration, |ljth
each  test, the null hypothesis  js that each  series  is not co-inteqrated  with
the measure  of income  inequality.
There  are  three  main  results  coming  from  an  analysis  of individual
pol  icy rneasures  and  measures  of incone  inequality.  First, there  is
substdntial  differences  between  the inferences  drawn  regarding  the presence
of co-integration  depending  on  whether  one  uses  the D.W.  or the A.D.F.  tesr
statistics.  In only  one  case,  with PITT  as the fiscal pol  icy measure,  the
D.|^l.  test is narginally  significant  'rhich  suggests  that co-integration  is
present. If  one  were  to use  the A.D.F.  test, however,  there  are 16
separate  occasions  where  the value  of test stat'istic is (at least
marginally)  consistent  with the presence  of co-integration. Sjnce  the f.irst
differences  of the individual  tjme  series  are not  white  noise,  tngle and
Granger  (1987)  recommend  that the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test be adopteo.
Second,  the jnference  drawn  from  the bi-variate  models  concerns  the
chojce  of the fiscal policy  measure  in the co-integrating  equation. l,lhereas
the growth  rate of the adjusted  monetary  base  is not co-integrated  with the
neasure  of income  inequal  ity,  the resuits  vary  with the four alternative
-t:lmeasures  of fiscal policy used  here. By  far, HEGBS  performs  the best.
Except  for the two  Atkinson  neasures  with the highest  inequality  aversion
parametersn  there  is at ledst  marginal  evidence  consistent  with the hjgh-
employment  federal  budget  surplus  being  co-integrated  with inequality  in the
size distribution of jncone. 
_There 
is at least  marginal  support  that PITT
is co-integrated  with each  of the four non-Atkinson  neasures.  Because  the
other  measures  are  components  of the federal  defjcit,  the robust  finding
with respect  to HEGBS  suggests  that budget  items  other  than  expenditures  on
goods  and  services  and  transfer payments  piay an important  role  in affecting
the size distribution of jncone. The  finding  with respect  to personal
jncome  tax payments  net of transfers  also  suggests  that this is an  fiscal
pol  icy variable  is important  in the government's  redistributive  efforts.
Third, it  appears  that the  neasure  of income  inequality  also  matters  in
efforts to uncover  co-integrdtion. As  seen  in Table  3, each  of the fiscal
pol  icy measures  is co-jntegrated  wjth inequality  in the size  distribution of
income  when  the Relative  mean  and  the Gini coefficient  are  used  as  measures
of  income  inequality.  tlith the Kakwanj  and  Theil measures,  the evidence  is
consistent  with PITT  and  HEGBS  being  co-integrated  with the measure  of
incorne  inequal  ity.  Finaliy, there  is nargjnal  evidence  which  suggests  that
HEGBS  is co-integrated  with the three  Atkinson  measures--A1,  A2,  and  43--
which  correspond  to the lowest  va'lues  of the inequality  aversion  parameter.
In short, the bi-variate  mode.ls  suggest  that a broad  measure  of fjscal
policy does  appear  to be  co-integrated  with inequality  'in  the size
distribution of income.  The  results suggest  that other  measures  of fiscal
policy fare less  welI and  the presence  of a long-run  equilibriurn
characterized  by an error-correct  i  on mechanism  depends  on the measure  of
lo'income  inequal  ity used. Furthermore,  individual'ly,  monetary  poljcy does  not
appear  to be  co-integrated  wjth jncome  inequality.
In Table  4, each  of the four fiscal policy  measures  are combined  with
the growth  rate of the adjusted  monetary  base. This approach  emphasjzes  the
consolidated  effects of fiscal and  monetary  policy as they  perta.in  to
inequafity  in the size distribution  of income.  Here,  the null hypothesis  is
that some  combination  of fiscal and  nonetary  policy variables  are co-
integrated  with the measures  of jncone  inequality.
l^lith  HEGBS  as the fiscal policy  measure,  by including  a monetary  policy
tern, the results jmprove  modestly  in the sense  that the A.D.F.  test
statistic  js signifjcant at the five-percent  level in six of the nine  cases
as compdred  wjth only  three  cases  when  HEGBS  js used  alone  in the co-
integrating  equation. Moreover,  w'ith  the other  three  measures  of income
inequal  ity,  there  is marginal  evidence  that HEGBS,  ASTLBAS  and  the measure
of  income  inequality are co-jntegrated. liith TRANS  and  ASTLBAS,  the
evidence  is consistent  with both  fiscal and  rnonetary  policy variables  being
co-integrated  with incorne  inequal  ity  in s.ix  cases. 0n1y  when  the Relative
mean  is the measure  of income  inequal  ity,  however,  is the test significant
at the five percent  level.  There  is also  marginal  evidence  that pITT  and
ASTLBAS  are co-integrated  with income  inequality when  Kakwani  and  A3  are the
measures.  Sinilarly, there  is marginal  support  that GpGS  and  ASTLBAS  are
co-integrated  with three  measures  of income  inequality--the  Relative  meann
the Gini coefficient  and  Theil.
Thus,  a1though  the results  tend  to vary.lcross  the measures  of
inequality  jn the size  distribution  used  and  the fiscal policy  measure,
there is evidence  that is consistent  with the combindtion  of fiscal and
t7monetary  pol.icy  variables  exhibiting  a long-run  equiiibriurn  reiationship
with income  inequality.  The  inclusjon  of a rnonetary  policy variable  seems
to augment  the long-run  equ.i  librium  relationship  between  fiscal policy
variables  and  inequality  in the size distribution  of income.  It  is
undenjable  that including  a fiscal policy terms  improves  the chances  of
finding evidence  that suggests  monetary  policy is co-.integrated  with .income
i  nequiil  i ty.
The  sequential  processing  of co-jntegratjng  regressions  suggests  that
in the first  pass,  an  important  variable  is omitted, Suppose  that the
"true" co-integrating  regression  includes  both  a fiscal policy and  monetary
policy variable  represented  in general  form  as
(7)  11 =al  Ft  +  aA  Mt  +  vt,
where  I denotes  the measure  of income  inequality.  Now  suppose  that equation
(7) is estimated  wjth F1  ornitted. The  residua1s  coming  from  this
.* regression,  vt, will  equal  vt plus  a1  F1.  That  js, the sum  of an  I(0) term
and  an I(1) term,  which  will  be  I(1).  Likewise,  omitting  t'lt  fron the
regression  wi'l  I yield nonstatjonary  errors.  0n1y  by including  both  fiscal
and  nonetary  pol  icy terns  will  the I(0) nature  of vt be  revealed.
The  evidence  reported  here  is consistent  with the notion  that changes
in both  federal  deficit and  monetary  policy variables  do  contribute  to
changes  in the level of jnequa.l  jty  in the sjze  distribution of income.
Moreover,  monetary  policy exhibits  this long-run  relationship  with the
inequal  ity measure  only  when  one  accounts  for the effects of changes  in
fiscal policy, particularly  when  the fiscal policy variable  adopted  gauges
federal  deficit policies.  This  finding  is interpreted  as  further  evidence
rttthdt the interaction between  the Federa.l  Reserve  and  Treasury  .is important
when  formulating  redistributive  policies,  Alternatively,  when  the
government  is interested  in achieving  income  redjstrjbution, it  must  take
account  of the coordindted  efforts of the fiscal  and  monetary  authoritjes.
fhus,  the co-.integration  test suggest  that h/hen  look.ing  at fiscal
policy measures  alone,  a long-run  relatjonship  with the size  distributjon of
income  depends  on  the inequality  measure  used. Moreover,  there  .is  marginal
evldence  that uncoverjng  a co-integrating  relatjonship  is more  likely when
a broad  measure,  iike the federal  deficit,  is used. With  monetary  policy,
the tests indicate  that monetary  policy is not co-integrated  with income
inequality  when  viewed  alone. Combining  broad  measures  of both  fiscal and
monetary  policy together  in the co-integrating  regression,  however,  suggests
that a long-run  relationship  does  exist,  Thus,  the interaction  between
fisca'l and  monetary  policy appear  to be important  jn formulating  strateg.ies
for redistributing  income.  Given  the sample  size caveatn  the evidence
suggests  that previous  econometric  model  ling of the relationship  between
policies and  inequality  may  be  misspecified.
3,4 The  Error-  Correct  i  on Model
Based  on the results from  the co-integration  tests, an error-correct  i  on
representation  of the system  includ'ing  both  fjscal and  nonetary  policy
variables  and  inequality  in the size distribut.ion  of income  js suggested.
The  error-correct  ion  representation  is estimated  using  vector-dutoregression
after  appropriate  transformat'ion  of the data so that each  serjes is
stationary. Also  included  in the est'imation  is the ,'equilibrium,,  error
specification  derived  from  the co-integrating  regression.  Through  variance
t9decomposition  derived  frorn  the vector-  autoregress  i  on  estimat.ion,  it  is
possible  to further deduce  the relatjve contrjbution  of both  fiscal and
monetary  policy measures  in explaining  movenents  in jncome  inequality.  The
variance  decompositions  tell  us how  much  of the forecast  variance  in edch
future forecast  period  would  be  due  to an  innovat.ion  jn the varjable  in
question.
Tables  5 - 11  report  the results  obtained  by  estimating  the error-
correction model. The  models  estinated  correspond  to those  cases  where  co-
integration  was  detected  at the five-percent  significance  level.  Three  nain
results are suggested  by  the error-correct  i  on  models.  First,  lagged  values
of ASTLBAS  are significantly related  to measures  of income  inequajity.  This
result suggests  that monetary  policy  does  Granger-cause  changes  in .income
inequal  ity.  In sjx of the seven  models  estimdted,  the results further
suggest  that increases  in the rate of growth  of the adjusted  base  are
associated  with decreases  in the income  .inequality.
Second.  the error-correct  i  on  term,  Zr_r, is a signjficant  explanatory
variable  in the equations  when  either the income  inequality  measure  or the
fiscal policy measure  is the dependent  varjable. This  finding js consistent
w.ith  income  inequality  and  fiscal policy adjusting  to "shocks,,  which  occur
in this equilibriurn  system.  Alternative.ly,  in disequilibrium,  adjustments
in income  inequality  and  fiscal policy are  observed.  Movements  in the
monetary  policy medsure,  however,  are independent  of disequilibrium  in this
model. Thus,  the results are  consjstent  tvith  monetary  pol  jcy not adjusting
to disequilibnium  shocks  in this system,
Third, in five of the seven  mode.ls,  there  is evidence  consistent  w.ith
changes  in the jncome  inequality  measure  Granger-causing  changes  in thefiscal pol  icy measure.  This  finding suggests  that fiscal policy responds  to
changes  in inequality  in the size  distribution  of income.  The  fiscal
authority's  response  to changes  in inequality  in the size  distribution of
incone  is probably  reflects a convex  comb.ination  of actjv.ist  policies
des.igned  to affect income  inequality, and  act.ions  such  as transfer programs
and  income  tax receipts  which  respond  passively  to movements  in the size
di  stri  bution  of income.
Table  12 reports the proportion  of forecast variance  of the
inequality  explained  using  selected  combinatjons  of fiscal and  monetary
pol  icy variables.I2/ The  sole  crjterja used  in the selectjon  process  was
that the tests for co-integration  were  signifjcant  at 
'least 
at the fjve-
percent  level.  The  models  estimated  include  two  lagged  values  of the
inequality  measure,  the fiscal pol.icy  neasure  and  the monetary  policy
neasure  conbined  with the first  lagged  value  of the error correction  lerm
frorn  the co-integrating  regression,  denoted  21_1.
The  results show  that the rate of growth  of the adjusted  monetary  base
general  ly accounts  for between  20 and  30 percent  of the forecast variance  in
the measure  of income  inequality.  Innovations  in the fiscal policy measure
vary  more,  with the federal  deficit neasure  accounting  for up  to 6 percent
of the forecast error variance.  Using  with transfer paynents  or federal
expenditures  on  goods  and  services  accounting  for roughoy  1l and  20  percent,
re  s  pect  i  ve  ly,
The  results of the varidnce  decomposition  are  consistent  wjth the
nolion  Ehat  changes  in monetary  policy have  ind'irect  effects on inequal  ity
in the size distribution of income.  Indeed,  when  coordinated  with fiscal
policy, the results suggest  that changes  in monetary  policy explain  between
ZLl/5 and  1/4 of the variation in the inequality  neasure,s  future pred.icted
values.
In short, the results of the co-integratjon  test (recalling  our sample
size) conducted  in this paper  suggest  that policymakers  should  not view  a
single (say)  fiscal policy act'ion  as a redistribution  mechan.ism  and  beljeve
that this action  b/ill have  a long-run  redistributive  inrpact. Instead,  the
policynaker  must  also  take  account  of the monetary  policy actjons  being
simultaneously  undertaken.  The  results  are  consistent  with the coordinated
use  of both  fiscal and  monetary  policy actions  as exhibiting  a long-run
equiljbrium  relationship  with inequality  in the sjze  distribution  of income.
IV. Summary
This  paper  examines  the role that changes  in fiscal and  monetary  policy
variables  play  with regard  to the tevel of inequality  in the size
distribution of totdl income.  l,le  first  examined  whether  fiscal and  monetary
pol  jcy measures  are  co-integrated  with various  measures  of inequality  in the
size distribution of income.  There  js marginal  evidence  presented  in this
paper  which  suggests  that a long-run  equilibrium  relationship  between
individual  fiscal pol  icy measures  and  the size distrjbution of total  incorne
exists.Individual  1y,  nonetary  poljcy is not co-integrated  wjth income
i  nequal  i  ty.
Combining  fiscal and  monetary  policy  measures  together  jn the co-
integrating  equation  suggests  that a long-run  relatjonship  does  exist.
Therefore,  the coord.ination  of fiscal  and  monetary  pol  jcy appear  to be
related  to changes  in the size distribution  of income.  Thjs  result has
important  impi  ications  for the policymaker  whose  aim  is redjstribution-  It
22is the jo.int  efforts of fiscal and  monetary  poljcy  which  exhjbit long-run
equilibriun  relationship  with income  inequality. Hence,  singular  policy
attempts  at redjstribution,  which  do  not consider  the impacts  of other
policies concumently  undertaken,  will  not likely achieve  the desired  long-
term  effects.
The  error-coffection  representation  is also  estimated  in this paper.
Monetary  policy has  not received  much  attention  in the literature which
investigates  the various  determinants  affecting  the size djstribution of
total  income  where  it  has  been  done  it  may  not have  correctly  specified
since co-integration appears  to be present.  From  the error-correct  j  on
representation,  variance  decomposition  is utilized to examine  whether
changes  in monetary  pol  jcy contribute  relative to changes  in fjscal policy
measures  in explaining  the forecast  variance  of the various  measures  of
income  inequal  ity.  Regardless  of the fisca'l policy  measure  used,  changes  in
the growth  rate of the adjusted  monetary  base  generally  explained  over 20
percent  of the forecast  variance  in inequality  neasures.  This  finding is
consistent  with rnonetary  poiicy being  an  important  policy tool when
policymakers  wish  to g...yrunjer.  the size distribution of income.
The  evidence  presented  above  shouid  be  viewed  as  preliminary. The
analysis  was  generally  atheoretical. Many  questions  stilI  renain  concerning
the transmission  nechanism  through  whjch  monetary  and  fiscal po1  icy actions
lead  to changes  in the size distribution  of income.  Moreover,  it  is
interesting  that the coordjnation  of fjscal and  nonetary  policy is  important
when  analyzing  movements  in the size  distribut.ion  of jncome..  Certainly,
understanding  the nature  of the coordination  scheme  that is  important  for
redistributive  purposes  deserves  further examination.
23FOOTNOTES
1. See  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980)  , pg. 411.
2. See  Tullock  (1983,  pg. 1.
3. See  Engle  and  Granger  (1987),  pg. 254.
4. A caveat  is applied  to the finding  that changes  jn the unenrployment
rate affect the size distribution  of income,  namely,  that these  results
depend  on  the sdmple  period  under  consideration.
5. Champernowne  (1974)  provides  an  exce'l  lent discussjon  concerning
desirable  critenia for a summary  measure  of inequality  for the size
d.istribution  of income.  Although  the Gin.i  coefficient satisfies his
criteria,  i-t  still  has  we'l  l-known  problems  (cf. Cowell  (1917).
Moreover,  as summary  measure,  one  can  not deduce  from  the Gini
coefficient  which  specific income  classes  are  net gainers  or net
losers.  Braun  (1988)  compared  djfferent inequality  measures  and  found
that the Gini coefficient  was  never  most  highly  correlated  with any  of
the fifteen SES  variables.
6.  See  Hasiag  and  Hein  (1989)  for a conpiete  description  of the
adjustment  process  used  to calculate  the adjusted  monetary  base.
?47. Among  those  programs  which  transfer jncome  are Aid for  Fam.i  lies  with
Dependent  Children.  Other  programs  designed  to redistributed .incone
make  payments-jn-kjnd  such  as the food stamp  progran.
8.  See  Grandmont  (1988)  for  a cornp1ete  discussion  of how  the
distrjbution of money  balances  will  affect short-run  aggregate  behavior
in a general  equilibrium  model. Note  that movenents  jn the size
distnibution  of income  are  not inconsistent  with output  being
unaffected. in other  words,  the relative price changes  resulting  from
monetary  policy may  be small, and  hence  not be detected  by in say  a
regression  of real GNP  on monetary  aggregates.  With  a constant  level
of real jncome,  however,  the distribution of norninal  jncome  may  be
affected.
9. For  jnstance,  see  Philljps (1987)  for a discussion  of some  of the
jssues  involved  jn testjng  for unit roots,
10.  lle  also included  a time  trend  in our  unit root tests.  For  each
series, the joint nu11  hypotheses  was  that the coefficient  on  the time
trend was  equal  to zero and  the coefficient on the lagged  level of the
dependent  variable  was  tested,  which  is one  of the tests forwarded  in
Dickey  and  Fuller (1981). Accepting  the null hypotheses  suggests  that
a unit-root does  exist.  Conversely,  rejecting  the null hypotheses  is
consistent  with the absence  of a unit root.  t.lith  the time  trend
included,  the resu'lts  of the tests are  the same  with regard  to the
presence  of a unit root to those  reported  jn Tables  l and  Z.  In other
?5!/ords,  a unjt root is suggested  for the variables  jn levels (or gro!,/th
rates for  STLBAS),  but after the appropriate  transformation,  the series
appear  to be  stationary. The  critical  values  for this test are
presented  in Dickey  and  Fu11er.  p.1063.
11.  For  example,  the autocorrelation  function  takes
0.82,  0.65, 0.50,  0.34 and  0.ZZ  for lags  0 through  5
on values  of  1.0,
with the HEGBS.
12.  There  are  two  things  to note  at this point.  First, because  there
are so  few  degrees  of freedom,  we  do  not calculate  the "optimal"  lag
length. The  specification  used  in the  VAR  .is  that lags  1 through  4 are
important. It  is true, however,  that .includ.ing  an  additional  ldg for
all  terms  in the VAR  gives  coefficients  which  stdtistical.ly
s  i  gni  f  i  cant.
Second,  the ordering  of the variance  decomposition  does  not seem
to matter. lle separately  examined  the variance  decomposition  with both
the ASTLBAS  ordered  fjrst  and  observe  no major  differences  compared
with the reported  findings,
zoREFE  RENCES
Aschauer,  D.  A., "Fiscal  Policy
Economic  Revjew,  75 (1985),  177-Zj.
and  Aggregate  Demand,  " American
Atkinson,  A. 8., "0n  the Measurement  of Inequality,,,  Journal  of
Economic  Theory,  2 (1970)  ,  244-63-
Atkinson,  A. B.  and  J. Stiglitz,  Lectures  on  Public  Finance,  (St.
Louis:  McGraw-Hill  and  Co., 1980).
Balke,  N. and  D.J. Slottje, ,,A  Macroeconometr  i  c Model  of Income
Inequality  in the U.S,,  Working  Paper  no. 8835,  Dept.  of Economics,  Southern
Methodi  st University  (  l98B)  .
8each,  C., "Cyclical  Sensitivity  of Aggregate  Income  Inequality,,'
Review  of tcononics  and  Statistics, 59  (1977),  56-66.
Blank,  R. M., "Disaggregating  the Effects  of Economic  Growth  on  the
Distribution  of Incone,"  Institute for Research  on  Poverty,  University  of
l.,|i  sconsi  n-Mad  i  son,  Discussion  paper  (1985).
Blank,  R. M. and  A. S, Blinder,  "  Macroeconomi  cs  , Income  Distribut.ion
and  Poverty," Fjqhtinq Poverty,  Edited  by S. H. 0anziger  and  D. H. |leinberg,
(Lambridge,  MA: Harvard  University press. 1986),  180-208.
Blinder,  A. S. and  H. Y. Esaki,  ,,l,lacroecononi  c Activity and  Income
Distrjbution: A Critical Review,,'  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics, 60
(1978),  604-0e.
Braun,  0., "Multiple  lileasurements  of U.S.  Income  Inequal  jty,,, Review  of
Economjc  and  Statistics /0 (August  1988),  398-405
Champernowne,  D. G., "A  Comparison  of Measures  of Inequality  of Incone
Distribution," Econonic  Journal  84 (1974),  787-816.
Cowe11,  F., Measuring  Inequality,  (Oxford:  phi1.lip  A1  lan, LTD.,lg77).
Engle,  R.F.  and  C.1,,/.J.  Granger,  ,'Co-  i  ntegrat  i  on  and  Error  Correctjon:
Representation,  tstimation,  and  Testjng,"  Econometrica,  55 (1987)  . Z5I-76.
------  and  8. S, Yoo,  "Forecastjng  and  Testing  in Co-integrated
Systems,"  Journal  of Econometrics,  35 (1982),  143-59.
Davidson,  J. E. H., D. F. Hendry,  F. Srba  and S. yeo,  ,,Econometric
Modelling  of the Aggregate  Tine-Series  Relationship  Between  Consumer,s
txpenditures  and  Income  in the Unjted  Kingdom,,'  Economjc  Journal  ,88  (1978),
661-92.
0ickey,  D.
Autoregress  i  ve
7?.
A. Ful  ler, "Like.l  ihood  Ratio  Statistics for A. and  l,l.
T.ine  Ser  i  es with a Unit Root,,  tconometrjca,  49 (1981),  IO57-Fuller, l,l.  A., Introduction  to Stat.istical  ljrne  Series,  (New  York:  John
tJiley and  Sons,  Inc.l9-761  .--
Granger,  C.tl.J., "Some  Properties  of Time  Series  Data  and  thejr Use  in
Econometric  Model  Specificatjon,"  Journal  of Econometrics.  16  (i991), 121-
30.
Grandmont,  J., Money  and  Value:  A Reconsideration  of Classical  and
NeoclassicalMonetary-TlEoi  je-sJCa-muiiiEel-Tffi  iI?geunTveFiTtv-Tiess, 18tur.  -
Hasl  ag,
and  Economi  c
(1989),  1-15.
Kaxwani,
Press,  1980)  .
J. H. and  S, E  Hein,  "Reserve  Requirements,  the Monetary  Base
Activity, Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas  Economic  Review,
Markhan  Press,
N., Income  Inequality and  Poveity, (0xford: Oxford  University
Metcalf,  C. E., "The  Size  Distrjbutjon  of Personal  Income  During  the
Business  Cyc1e,"  American  Economjc  Review,  59 (1969),  657-68.
,  An  Econometric  Model  gf the Incorne  Distnibutjon,  (Chicago:
1-9n).
Musgrave,  R. A., K. E. Case  and  H. Leonard,  ,,The  Djstribution  of
Fiscal  Eurdens  and  Benefits,"  Public  Finance  Quarterly,  2 (l9l4), 259-311.
_  Pechman,  J. A., and  B. A. 0kner,. [,Jho  Bears  the Tax  Burden?,
(l.lashington,  D.C.  : Brookings  Institution]gT4)l
Phillips, P. C. 8., "Time  Series  Regression  wjth a Unit Root,,,
Econometrica,  55 (1987)  , 277  -302.
Russell,  |.l.  R,,0.  J. Slottje and  J. H. Haslag,  r,A  Sensitivity
Analysis  of the Effect  of Fiscal  and  Monetary  Policy  on  the Size
Distributjon  of Income  in the U.S.," in Advances  in Econometrics,  George
Rhodes  (ed.) (Greenwich,  CT:  JAI press,  T986)l-
, Macroecalem!!  Activity and  Income  Inequality  in the u.S-,
1952-81. 
--(GreenwTEhJT: 
JAI press;Ib8t[  -
,, -- Tl.i]:-H.,  Economics  and  Infornation  Theory,  (Amsterdam:  North-
flo  I  rand, I9b/  )  .
Tul  lock,  G., Iconomics  of Income Redi  stributjon, (Boston:  K  l  uwer-
Ni  jhoff,  1983)  .
Pareto,  V.,
Libraria, 189/).
Mauvale  di Econonica  Politica, (Mi)an:  Societa  Editruce














I' The  adjusted
'  The  cri  t i  cal
s-percent  level
Value  of






























Unit Root  Tests  (on levels)















monetary  base  variabie js  in growth  rates.
value  of the (Augmented)  Dickey-Fuller  test-statistic at the
is -3.00  (see  Fuller (1976)  p.373).
29Table  2
lJnit Root  Tests (on first  differences)
D  ickey-Fu  1  1er  Test-Statistics
Value  of






























































'  Denotes  fi rst-d ifference  of log-ievel  s for
2 Denotes  percent-change  calculated  using
these  vari  abl  es.
X*  -  X*  t
(x1  + xr_r)/2
IUTable  3
Results  from  the B  i  -Vari  ate
Co-jntegration  Tests
Pol  i  cy Measures
I  nequal  ity
MeasuTe  GPGS  PITT  TRANS  HEGBS  ASTLBAS
!-,!-.-4-.!=L  q.'.!=-A-=.!..'.i..  !-,-!-.--4-.!-.-l-=  q=!-.-A=!_.L  q[-a.=q"
Kakwani  O.52  -2.74  0.72  -3.29**  0.54  -2.58  0.56  -3.23*  0.35  -0.9i
Re.l  at  i  ve
lrfean  O.42  -3.65** 0.86* _3.23* 0.45  _3.36**  0.58  _4-16** O.27  _i.
Theil  0.36  -2.96*  0.69  -2.91* 0.37  -2.73  0.43  -3.55** 0.26  -0.1
Gini  0.38  -3.21*  0.75  -3.13* 0.39  -?.91* 0.48  -3.79** 0.27  -1.1
Atkinson  0.36  -2.71  0.64  -?.7  0.36  -2.53  O.4Z  -3.2*  O.Z7  -0.1
A1,
e=0.  5
42,  0.34  -2.6  0.61  -2.6  0.35  -2.44  0.40  -3.06*  0.27  -0-r
e  =0.  75
A3,  0.34  -2.51  0.58  -?.52  0.34  -2.36  0.39  -2.94*  0.26  -0.1
e  =0  .95
A4,  0.33  -2.26  0.52  -2.30  0.33  -2.15  0-36  -2.61  0.27  -0.1
A5,  0.32  -2.09  0.46  -2.t4  0.32  -2.0I  0.34  -2.39  0.27  -0.
e=2  .O
*  indicates  significance  at the 10%  level ** indicates  signifjcance  at the 5%  level
3lTabie  4
Resul  ts fron Co-Inteqration  Test
wjth Combinations  of the Fiscll policy  Measures
and  the St. Louis  Adjusted  Monetary  Base
Fiscal Pol  icy lileasures  (with ASTLBAS)



















































*  i  ndj  cdtes significance dt






Resu  I  ts from  the
Gi  ni Coeffi  ci  ent
Table  5
Error-Correct  i  on Model
as the Income  Inequality Measure
I  ndependent












(  -0.04  )
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257  .7  4*
(  2.01)
0.175






















i  ndi  cates  significance












33Results  from  the
with the Relative  Mean  as
Table  6
Emor-Correction  Model
















































(0.  52  )
0.78  E-2
(  r.  11)
-0.058*
(-0.e4)
0.  1  15*
(  1.  85)
ASTLBAS
i  ndi  cates  s  i  gni  fi cance
i  ndi  cates  significance
3.975*
(-1.84)
ten-percent  I  eve  l
five-percent I  evel
-0.  571
(  -3.  e2)
-0.  239
(  -0.01  )
at  the
at the
34Results  from  the
with the Relative  Mean  as
Table  7
Error-Conect  i  on Model




























































i  nd  j  cates  significance  at
i  nd  i  cates  significance  at
-2.95  '
(-1.3s)




35Results  from  the
with the Relative  Mean  as
Table  8
Error-Correct  i on l'lode  I
the Income  Inequal  ity Measure
I  ndependent









Dependent  Vari  abi  es
HEGBS
0.248















































-0  .  118
(0.31)
i  nd  j  cates significance
indicates signi  f  icance





Resu  I  ts from
Atkinson  Measure
Table  9
the Error-Correct  i on l,lodel
(Af) as the Income  Inequality Measure
i  ndependent

































(  -0.  61)
n  'rt  E  a
























indicates s  i  gni  fi cance  ar
indicates signi  ficance at
-547.95**
(-2.  io)
ten-percent  I  eve'l





Resu  I  ts from
Atkinson  Measure
Table  10
the Eror-Correction Mode  l
(A2)  as the Incorne  Inequality Measure
I  ndependent






H  EcBSt  _2
ASTLBASt_  1
ASTLBASt_2


































(  1.  34)
n  ?  ?Q**
(2.06)
0.13  t-4








i  ndi  cates  s  i  gn  if  i  cance












Resu  I  ts from
Atkinson  Measure
Table  11
the Error-Correct  i  on Model
(A3)  as the Income  Inequality Measure
I  ndependent








Dependent  Var  i  abl  es
HEGBS
0.  398








(  -0.8e  )
27.43



















(  -2.05  )
AJ
-0.51  t-3

















i  ndi  cates  significance





39Resu  I  ts from
from  Sel  ected
Table  12
Vari  ance  Decomposition




error  jn  :
Relative
Mean
GPGS  - ASTLBAS
19.9 -  26.4
Innovati  ons  in:
TRANS  _ ASTLBAS
LL. t  -  Zt.L
HEGBS  .  ASTLEAS
bl n  t









LEGEND:  The  first  number  in the column  reDresents
forecast  error variance  contributed  by the fisca-
the second  number  represents  the proportion  r{,hich
innovations  in the monetary  policy  variable,
?no
the proportion  of the
pol  i  cy measure,  whereas
is expl  ai  ned  by
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